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CHAPTER
R ights Seriously

In

^

I

,

Ronald Dworkin proposes

his rights thesis as an alternative to legal positivism

he rakes to be the ruling concept of law.

C;I

Briefly,

his rights thesis maintains that judicial decisions char-

acteristically do, and should, enforce the existing rights
of the parties involved,

even in hard cases where those

rights do not seem to be clearly defined by explicit legal
rules.

In such cases judges have a duty to discover the

legal rights and duties of the parties before

sr

then..

chough theii decisions may be controversial and other -n-

sponsible judges might well decide differently.

Dworkin

'

s

proposal does not appear to be, nor is it

intended to be, a novel and radical thesis.

Rather it is

intended to fit the familiar facts about what judges actually do better than other models of judicial behavior cur-

rently popular in theories of jurisprudence.

The ordinary

citizen believes that it is the duty of a judge merely to
apply

and to decide cases on the basis of estab-

the law

lished legal standards which pre-determine his legal right
nd obligations.
'

the basis
<

a.i.os

and unconstitutional,

o create new legal rights and impose sanctions

judges

r

It seems unfair,

of an appeal to arbitrarily chosen extra-leg

or co considerations or so litiCtix e r

-

r

*

y

2

the doctrine of judicial discretion widely accepted
by

legal theorists allows for just this sort of ex post
facto

legislation of legal rights.

Dworkin argues that any legal theory which takes
seriously the notion cf individual human rights cannot just—
^

judicial decisions based either on arguments of social

policy or on purely subjective moral convictions, even in

admittedly difficult cases.

Moreover, a theory which does

not take rights seriously cannot accurately describe the
role and functions of judges in the American legal system.
But

Dworkm

'

s

rights thesis is not merely descriptive.

is also a normative theory,

suggesting

hov.

It

judges should

correctly go about: determining what the legal rights of
citizens are.

It considers what duties and responsibilities

judges should recognize and what questions they should ask

themselves in those cases where the nature of the legal
rights involved is a controversial issue.

In his collection of essays, Dworkin intends to

derme

and defend what he views as a liberal theory of law.

iLe

objective of any general theory of law must be to propose an
Everyone

answer to the broad question "what is the law."
can cite examples of specific laws.

The difficulty in

answering this general question does not rest
to recognize those things which the term 'law'

or.

an inaoilxvy

io coiruucnx^

used to refer to.
a

Yet a list of examples does not constitute

definition which will serve to explain why some things fall

under this general term and others do not.
v

Dworkin, like

others who have offered differing answers to this question,
is not concerned merely with illuminating our vague understand-

ing of the correct use of the term 'law'.

simply a linguistic one.

The problem is not

Dworkin is concerned with the

social and political consequences of accepting a particular

answer as authoritative.

His belief that the prevailing

theory of law is wrong is based not only on his contention
that it provides an inaccurate account of what judges in fact
do,

but also on his conviction that this theory has dangerous

consequences which run counter to the principles on which
our legal system was founded.

Legal positivism, which is derived from the legal

theory of Jeremy Bentham, attempts to answer the question
"what is law" by defining the criteria one may use to dis-

tinguish legal rules from other standards of conduct and
social rules of behavior.

Bentham developed his own theory

of jurisprudence in opposition to natural law theorists

because of what he saw as the dangers involved in the view
that the law has some transcendent metaphysical status and
is therefore not subject to human criticism and change.

If

the specific law s of a community are viewed as somehow re7

4

reason, then citizens will take a different view of their

obligation to obey such laws than if they are recognized as
commands of a particular sovereign backed by threats and

punishments.

What is at issue here is the justification of

particular laws and

the legitimacy of the use of force in

requiring certain standards of conduct.

Bentham declared that the idea of any natural human
rights is nonsense, that the only rights citizens enjoy are
those explicitly granted by the laws of the state.

Against

those who defended the existence of self-evident natural
rights, Bentham maintained that "all this talk about nature,

natural rights, natural justice and injustice, proves two
things and two things only, the heat of the passions and the

darkness of the understanding."^
The existence of natural rights seems to require

special metaphysical assumptions which cannot be empirically
validated, even in principle.

If there can be no objective

verification of the moral claims underlying theories of
natural rightsthen these claims seem to be a matter of individual subjective opinion, which is irrelevant to the empirical
facts about the establishment and maintenance of an effective

legal system.

Bentham emphasized the distinction between

morality and the law because of the important political
implications of separating questions of legal and moral
obligation.

5

According to positivist theory, Aquinas' identification
of law and morality, which gives rise to the famous pronounce-

ment that "unjust law is not law", obscures the distinction
between what law is and what it ought to be.

What the law

is in a particular society is a matter of fact about the

political institutions governing that society.

Those in-

stitutions may be criticized according to moral standards

concerning the requirements of justice.

But the simple

denial that certain regulations are part of the law because
they are viewed as unjust merely leads to an oversimplifi-

cation and confusion of complex issues,
Such apparently unjust rules may in all other important

respects fit the criteria for valid laws in a community and

may in fact be enforced by the political authorities.

More-

over, if each individual is in a position to decide for him-

self what societal demands he must regard as legally binding
then each person will be a law unto himself.

Such a concept

of law disregards the fundamental nature of law as governing
a group of individuals and preserving order by establishing

general standards of behavior which all must follow.

Although critical of existing legal systems, Bentham

worried about the anarchical effects of individual citizens
deciding what is and what is not valid
subjective moral judgements*

lav/

on the basis of

if legal obligation is dis-

tinguished from moral obligation, then if a citizen finds

particular law to be unjust he may refuse to obey it, yet

a

6

still recognize the legitimate authority of the state to
pc* ii i n

him for his actions, because he also accepts a general

obligation to obey the laws of the community.
Traditional natural law theory does assume that there
are some objective standards of behavior and some fundamental

rules governing the association of individuals which must

apply to all societies and which exist prior to the establish-

ment of any organized political system.

These general

requirements and prohibitions may be supplemented or more
specifically determined by rules which are a matter of
contract or social convention, so long as these are consists
ent with the general demands of natural law.
The obligatory quality of natural law rests on the

recognized rationality of its requirements.

In this sense

at least legal obligation is held not to differ from moral

obligation.

The commands of a sovereign or other official

of the state are not viewed as legally binding simply

because they can be backed up by the exercise of punitive
sanctions.

This is merely violence under the guise of

legitimate authority, "the gunman writ large."

If there is

no rational basis for these commands, then no obligation

arises from them, even though a person may be forced to do
things against his will and against his conscience.
The positivist theory of Bentham and Austin does not

capture this aspect of law as representing rules of behavior

7

accepted and endorsed by members of the community as being
appropriate and reasonable standards according to which they

believe they should pattern their behavior.

However, natural

law theory does not seem appropriate to complex legal systems
in which large portions of the enacted law are obviously

contingent products of human creation designed to effect
various social purposes

,

but bearing little relation to the

demands of natural justice and in no way derived from some

objective requirements for human association.

Both these

answers to the general question "what is law" point to

important aspects of an organized legal system, yet both
seem inadequate in fundamental ways.
H.

L.

A.

Hart's conception of law as a union of primary

and secondary rules explores the essential continuity be-

tween socially accepted moral standards and specifically
legal rules of conduct.

At the same time he emphasizes the

fundamental differences between the two forms of obligation
and preserves the notion of the law as something consciously

created and accepted as valid by a particular group, in
order to promote differing social and political goals.

His

theory recognizes the fact that there is and has been a

strong connection between the moral attitudes and convictions
of members of a community and the requirements of its legal

system, but denies that there is any necessary connection

between the two.

8

Hart criticizes the definition of law as a command of
a

recognized sovereign backed by threats because of its

failure to distinguish between being obliged to do something
and having an obligation.

Some level of justification and

acceptibility of rules by those who follow them is part of
the ordinary conception of legal obligation, beyond mere

obedience through fear.

According to Hart's theory, the

primary rules of obligation within a society establish
rights and impose duties on individuals, and furthermore

justify the exercise of sanctions against those who violate
these socially accepted rules.

Such social rules governing

the behavior of members of the community are designed to

ensure or promote the survival of the society.

The majority

must for the most part willingly abide by these rules of
conduct; they must be commonly accepted in order to impose
a

general obligation to obey them.
"Rules are conceived and spoken of as imposing oblig-

ations when the general demand for conformity is insistent
and the social pressure brought to bear on those
or threaten to is great."

7

v.

ho deviate

if these social rules are backed

by physical sanctions they may be viewed as a primitive form
of law, though not yet as a legal system.

But primary rules

may also be enforced through other sorts of sanctions,

verbal expressions of disapproval, or other means of reproachintended to elicit shame and remorse.

In this case,

the

.

primary social rules of the community may be equivalent to
the customary morality commonly accepted by the group.

Although on Hart's theory the moral standards of the
community may form the basis for the acceptance of legal
rules and obligations, something more is necessary for the

establishment of an actual legal system.

His theory of law

requires the existence of secondary rules which do not

directly govern the actions of individuals, but rather are
concerned with defining which social rules are to be recognized as legallyvalid, and with conferring powers on certain

officials to establish new laws and change old ones.
The distinguishing feature of a (municipal)

legal

system is the existence of a rule of recognition which
constitutes the criterion by which primary rules are defined
as valid lav/ in a particular society.

Any social or moral

standards which do not fall under the established rule of

recognition are no part of the law.

The rule of recognition

may be very simple, or quite complex, depending on the

particular society.

But in any case the rule of recognition

cannot itself be validated since it is the ultimate test of

what is law.

It is established by its general acceptance

by those judges and officials who are in a position to apply
the laws

Hart's model of rules is intended to be a general

theory of what law is, applicable to all different societies

10

and social groups, including clubs and associations, not

only to political systems.

All cases where the term

'lav:’

is applicable should show the general features of Hart's

conception of law, that is, some accepted rules and some
test for which ones of these are to be considered valid as
law.

However

,

the content of these rules will change in

different societies, and the general rule of recognition
may be very complicated to state in a modern complex legal

system like our own.

Dworkin views Hart's theory as the most sophisticated

version of legal positivism, yet still finds its model
fundamentally inadequate as an account of the workings of
the American legal system, especially in its theory of

adjudication.

Although he is intent on demonstrating that

the United States provides at least one counter-example to

Hart's general theory, it is not entirely clear whether

Dworkin would maintain that Hart's theory is inapplicable to
other sorts of legal systems, and if so what sort of general

theory of law he

T

v.

ould offer to replace Hart's.

The liberal

theory of law Dworkin proposes seems at most to be intended
to describe the British and American systems of law.

His major contention against Hart is that in the

American legal system it is not possible to distinguish
specifically legal standards from moral ones by any simple

.
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socially accepted rule of recognition.

He maintains that the

law consists of more than explicit rules and social practices:
it includes at least some moral principles which are embedded
in explicit statutes,

provisions.

common law precedents and constitutional

These principles cannot be explicitly and un-

controversially verified as legally valid, yet judges and
lawyers in fact do appeal to them in deciding difficult cases

where explicit rules do not seem clearly applicable.
If these moral principles are treated as extra-legal

standards, which judges may appeal to but which they are not
legally obligated to recognize, then in at least some cases
judges will be basing their decisions not on established law

but on subjectively chosen moral principles or judgements

about desirable social policies.

When explicit rules do not

cover particular cases, Hart's theory allows for judicial

discretion in making new laws, creating new rights and duties,
without any accepted legal standards to set limits on their
decisions
The dangers inherent in defining law as Hart does appear
to Dworkin to have to do with the way in which judges view

their official responsibilities.

The model of rules en-

courages judges to regard the exercise of discretion (in the
sense that Hart describes) as a necessary and desirable thing.

According to Dworkin, however, if judges feel free to legislate on matters of social policy and make politically ex-

pedient decisions, because of the “open texture" of the law,
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then the status of individual rights of citizens will be

undermined.

Certain fundamental rights of citizens which

should be protected may be ignored or abridged without the
judges responsible believing that any injustice has been done.

Dworkin contends that we have many legal rights which
are not created by any explicit political decisions or

social practices.

The positivist distinction between moral-

ity and law reduces all rights which are not explicitly made

legally valid to the status of purely moral rights which may
be of importance for our judgements concerning the justice
of our legal system, but not for our understanding of what

our legal rights are.

Dworkin maintains that people have

legal rights which are "natural" in that they are not the

product of any legislation, social conventions or political
contract.

These rights constitute "independent grounds for

judging legislation and custom;" 3 they are legal rights
.

because they are defined by the political principles stated
or embedded in the American Constitution.

Dworkin embraces

a

general political theory which

assumes that individuals have moral rights against the state

prior to the rights created by explicit legislation.

Such

rights must be taken seriously in American law because the

political theory behind the Constitution takes as

a

fundamental

doctrine the position that there are some moral rights of
individuals which may not be violated in the service or

13

purely utilitarian goals favored by the majority of citizens.
The Bill of Rights is designed to protect individual citizens
against, the enactment of certain policies, regardless of their

appeal to majority interests.

abstract moral provisions as

In order to apply such
lav;

in concrete cases, Dworkin

argues that judges must and should develop a legal theory

which consistently and coherently explains and justifies the
moral framework of our legal system.

If Dworkin is right in

this, then one cannot define and determine what the law is

or what the legal rights of citizens are without being

prepared to answer at least some basic questions concerning
political morality, and to present moral arguments in support
of one's general theory.

According to Dworkin, his rights thesis makes no
special ontological assumptions about the nature of moral
rights.

He invokes no ghostly entities or eternal laws of

reason.

Nor does he treat natural rights as "spectral

attributes worn by primitive men like amulets, which they
carry into civilization to ward off tyranny."

4

Rather, he

maintains that his theory of rights involves no more contro-

versial assumptions than the prevailing political theory of
economic utilitarianism, which takes as fundamental the

notion of a collective goal of a community.
For Dworkin, Claims about moral rights represent

merely

a

special form of judgement about what it is rignu

14

and wrong for a government to do. "A man has a moral ricrht

against the state if for some reason the state would do wrong
to treat him in a certain way, even though it would be in

the general interest to do so ."

5

This formal definition of

a right does not specify what rights,

if any, citizens have,

nor does it identify what reasons would support particular

rights that are affirmed.

It does, however,

characterize a

right, not as some sort of odd ontological entity, but as a

moral judgement, the validity of which can only be established
through convincing moral arguments.
It is puzzling to consider what relation Dworkin's

use of the term 'natural' bears to the concept of law

traditionally regarded as natural law theory.

Dworkin's

political theory assumes that individuals have some moral
rights against the state which a legal system should

recog-

nize, but he would probably not wish to maintain that every

legal system must recognize such rights in order for its
laws to be valid and impose legal obligations.

His defin-

ition of legal rights as a particular kind of moral political

rights may be a conception of law applicable to the American
legal system, but it may not be acceptable as an answer to
the general question "what is law."

Dworkin does not defend a particular moral theory

which he holds to be objectively correct and from which one
could derive the specific moral and political rights which

15

individuals must be regarded in general as possessing. He
does propose

a theory which he believes best captures the

sense of justice underlying the political institutions and

practices in the United States,

But his formal definition

of rights does not elaborate the specific nature of these

rights.

Rather, he believes that it is essentially contro-

versial what concrete rights individuals have, even in the
United States.
It seems that on one interpretation, Dworkin's talk

about natural rights is entirely compatible with the general

positivist view that law is essentially a matter of human
creation, consisting of certain facts about the organization
of particular human groups and political associations, rather

than an objective standard transcending and applying to all
such groups.

Dworkin does not seem to be defending a neces-

sary connection between law and morality, but rather a spec-

ific and contingent connection which exists in American law.
If moral standards and principles form part of the

legal system of this country,

it:

is because of the particular

political philosophy which shaped our Constitution,

That

oolitical philosophy, as embodied in the Constitution, con-

ditioned the creation of the legal institutions and social
practices we as citizens accept.

The principles stated in

the Constitution explicitly establish some moral rights as

16

legal rights to be protected and promoted by the government.

These principles are taken as fundamental and are used to
judge the legality of legislative enactments and social

practices

,

but it is difficult to see why for that reason

they should be regarded as "natural".
The Constitution, and the moral standards for govern-

ment it expresses, were in fact formally accepted and
agreed upon as an appropriate articulation of the political
desires and purposes of the newly-formed United States.

Constitution derives its authority as

a

The

criterion for legal-

ity from the continued acceptance of its general principles
by the community it governs.

If this were not so,

it could

be changed in order to reflect the changing moral and

political convictions of the majority of citizens.
If individuals are recognized as having fundamental

legal rights against the state, or minority groups have

rights which cannot legally be interfered with despite

majority interests, this is not because there is some objective necessity for the legal recognition of such rights, but

because the majority of those governed have accepted, at
least tacitly, the correctness and justice of those provisions.

The majority of citizens may agree, on consideration, that
there do exist certain natural rights of human beings and
for that reason approve of the legal validation of those

rights, but that concensus would not in itself make such

17

rights exist as legal rights.

Other moral judgements may

be accepted in -general by the community, yet form no part

of the legal system.

Some further formal enactment would

be required to establish such moral standards as legal

rules

.

One may interpret Dworkin's position as maintaining
that there are some principles which are implicit
in,

,

or embedded

the actual rules and provisions accepted as law by the

society

,

and that these may define certain legal rights not

explicitly stated or articulated.

Dworkin's rights thesis

does s_eem to express a customary conception about the re-

sponsibility of judges in our legal system which is not
adequately characterized by Hart's model of law as explicit
rules.

But it is not clear that Dworkin has shown that the

general approach taken by positivist theorists to the question
"what is law" is wholly misguided.

The fact that some Constitutional provisions and other

rules of law do state requirements concerning such things
as the right to liberty and due process of law may make moral

argumentation about rights part of the process of determining
the legal validity of specific rules and practices, so that

there is no simple test for what the law is in concrete cases.

But this does not mean that there is in principle no dis-

tinction between moral and legal standards.
It seems possible to revise Hart's general theory

.

18

somewhat in order to take into account the major thrust of

Dworkin's rights thesis, that is, in order to avoid the
dangerous doctrine of unlimited judicial discretion.

One

would have to extend Hart's rule of recognition for what is
valid law in the United States to include those standards

which are neither explicit rules of law nor accepted social
practices but which nevertheless judges commonly do recognize
as legally binding on them.

Such a revision would preserve

the fundamental characteristics of law under Hart's con-

ception, while taking into account the particular nature of
the American legal system, which in general does not view

consideration of the question "what is justice in this case"
as irrelevant to determination of what the law is in concrete

cases

,

,

19
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CHAPTER

II

In The Concept of Law Hart proposes to examine and

elucidate the general framework of legal thought.

mary purpose is not to defend

a

His pri-

strict definition of law,

in the sense of providing a clear rule by which one can

test the correctness of ones use of the term 'law*.

Rather,

his intention is to "advance legal theory by providing an

improved analysis of the distinctive structure of a municipal legal system and a better understanding of the resem-

blances and differences between law, coercion and morality,
as types of social phenomena."^

Although his model of law

as a set of rules may be too narrow to include all the

standards and principles which should be regarded as binding law in our system, it has nevertheless, as Dworkin

recognizes, contributed a great deal to the philosophical

clarification of the issues involved in contemporary jurisprudence

.

The 19th century philosopher John Austin, in his

Province of Jurisprudence Determined

,

followed Bentham in

defining the law of a community as consisting of the general
commands of its sovereign.

The sovereign in any given

political society is defined as that individual or deter-

minate group receiving habitual obedience from the majority
of the people, and not in turn in the habit of obeying any-

one else.

A citizen is under

a

legal obligation if he is

21

among those adaressed by a command of the sovereign and if
he is liable to be punished if he does not comply.

mand specifies

a

A com-

wish expressed by an intelligent being that

another person perform or forbear from some act, with the
added feature that the person expressing the wish has the

power to inflict some evil on the other if the wish is disregarded.

Commands from the sovereign define legal duties:

"wherever a duty lies,

whenever

a

a

command has been signified; and

command is signified,

a

duty is imposed ." 2

The commands of the sovereign may be signified

through conduct as well as through articulated orders.

The

sovereign cannot forsee all future contingencies or enumerate all the implications and details of the application of

general commands to specific circumstances.

The law as

stated may have "furry edges" which must be clarified and

determined by judges as new situations arise.

But judges do

not issue commands or create laws on their own authority.

Whatever authority they have is derived from the sovereign
and the force of the state which will back up their deci-

sions with sanctions and punishments.

Since the sovereign

may overturn any decisions not approved of, the orders
issued by judges impose legal obligations because they are
tacitly, though not necessarily explicitly, commanded by
the sovereign.

Austin's definition of law dominated legal thinking
for many years.

However, there are two main problems with

this conception of

lav;,

which Hart discusses.

In the first

place, in modern democratic political systems there is
no

recognizable sovereign of the sort Austin describes.

There

is no individual or determinate group with unlimited
power

to issue commands and impose sanctions, and not in the
habit
Gi obeying anyone else.

The locus of power is more diffuse

than the simplicity of Austin's model allows.

Secondly, the

notion of a

lav;

pect of

as something potentially in conflict with the

la\^

as a command,

although it points to the as-

desires of individual citizens which must be enforced
through penalties, does not adequately account for the authority involved in the rule of law.

Such a conception of

law ignores the normative function of legal rules, the fact

that citizens recognize legal obligations because they gene-

rally believe in the rationality and desirability of the

standards of conduct governing their behavior.

The sover-

eign, or the institutions of government, derive their legal

authority, in distinction from their power to exact obedience, from the acceptance by the majority of those governed
of the fact that they have a legitimate right to rule.

A social rule involves more than

habit of obedience

From an external point of

or conformity in ones behavior.

view one may observe that there exists
particular society if there is

a

a

a social rule in a

general conformity in the

behavior of individuals and if deviation from the common
standard of behavior is met with strong disapproval or the

23

exercise of puntive sanctions.

But the reasons for this

conformity of behavior are important for an understanding
°-

binding character of social rules.

point of view held by those who endorse

a

From an internal

particular set of

rules, a rule involves more than mere coincidence of habitual behavior, or predictions of punishment for deviation.

The rule is regarded as a necessary or desirable standard of

behavior and is taken as a justification for the punishment
or coercion of those who threaten to deviate.

Hart also emphasizes the logical distinction between

different kinds of rules.

Some social rules are viewed as

binding on individuals and imposing obligations simply because they are willingly accepted by the majority of citizens as appropriate standards of behavior.

Other rules are

recognized as binding because they are formulated in accordance with another rule which establishes

validity.

a crite.ricn

for

If a certain procedure is recognized as the pro-

per method for the enactment of binding regulations, then
any rules created in that manner will be accepted as im-

posing an obligation, regardless of whether the content of
that rule was previously part of the accepted practices of
the community.

A legal system, on Hart's conception, is distinguished

from customary morality by the existence of these secondary
rules which establish the validity of primary rules of be-

havior on the basis of their means of enactment and accep-

24

tance and which confer powers on certain officials
to create
or amend specifically legal rules.
The rule of recognition
for what is valid law in a particular society is
the only

rule which is binding for the sole reason that it is
accepted by the community.
'

All other laws fall under the tests

or validity stipulated by this overarching rule which is

the ultimate test of law.

The rule of recognition for law may be quite compli-

cated and is often never explicitly articulated.

most part

,

"For the

the rule of recognition is not stated, but its

existence is shown in the way in which particular rules are
identified, either by courts or other officials or private

persons or their advisors." 3

The existence of such a su-

preme rule cannot be validated in the same way as the other
rules it authorizes.

Its existence can be asserted only as

an external statement of fact, but it can be recognized by

the generally concordant practices of officials and private

citizens in identifying the law according to specific criteria.

The ordinary citizen may not concern himself with the

established criteria of legal validity.

He may dimply obey

laws because others do, or out of fear of punishment, with-

out necessarily regarding these standards as imposing obli-

gations.

The judges, however, who in their official capa-

city must apply primary legal rules, must take

a

more res-

ponsible and critical attitude to ward the rules which

°5

govern their operations.
exist as

a

Any rule of recognition must

public and internally endorsed standard for

official behavior and judicial decision.

Judges must view

deviations from a common standard for official conduct as
serious lapses.

If judges and other officials simply obey

rules for their own part, without concerning themselves

with the nature of their legal obligations or demanding

conformity from other officials in recognizing standards
for legal validity, then the unity and continuity of the

legal system will be threatened, since the rule of recogni-

tion is constituted (at least) as a matter of social practice among officials.

One objection to positivist theory has been the charge
that it presents an oversimplified and mechanistic model of
the judicial function as merely applying clearly established

rules of law.

In response to such charges of formalism.

Hart emphasizes the necessity and desirability of judicial

discretion in interpreting and applying legal rules.

He

introduces the notion of an "open texture" to the law by

pointing out the inherent limitations of the general language in which rules are formulated.

Because laws must be

broadly applicable, they must involve general classifications of persons, acts and situations.

But the application

of these necessarily general rules to particular persons

and circumstances cannot, even in principle, be a mechanical
or simple procedure.

Questions will inevitably arise con-
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cerning the extension of general terms and at some
point
i_he general rule will prove to
be indeterminate in its
application.

Some degree of subjective interpretation of

the specific situation and the aplicability of
rules re-

lating to it must be involved when a judge decides
difficult
cases, where his choice is not plainly ordained by the

existing rules.
Hart argues that although it might be possible to

enumerate and pre-determine through legislation the acceptable applications of a general term, this formalization
v/ould be undesirable.

Freezing the meaning of a rule, in

ignorance of possible future situations, would involve

blindly pre-judging future cases.

Such rigidity in defining

the intent of legal rules might necessitate judicial deci-

sions which run counter to the social goals originally

presumed to be furthered by the particular law.

Hart

maintains that in every legal system some compromise must
be made between the need to formulate definite rules of

behavior which individual citizens can apply for themselves

without appeal to official interpretation and the need to
leave open for future determination some uncertain or un-

envisioned issues.
In every legal system, according to Hart,

there are

large areas left open for the exercise of judicial discretion:

the clarification and concrete determination of vague

or abstract legal standards, the resolution of uncertainties

concerning legislative enactments, and the development and
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qualification of rules not precisely articulated in
.authoritative precedents of the common law. This open
texture

of the

lav;

makes it necessary for the courts actually to

create new laws and reformulate old ones, despite
their

disclaimers that they are only interpreting already existing
laws established by precedent or legislation.

"At the mar-

gin of rules and in the fields left open by the theory of

precedents, the courts perform

a

rule-producing function

which administrative bodies perform centrally in the elaboration of variable standards

." 4

Hart does not believe that judges are totally free
from constraint in exercising their power to create law:
"at any given moment judges, even those of a supreme court,

are parts of a system the rules of which are determinate

enough at the center to supply standards of correct judicial

decision." 5

Judges are not free to disregard these stan-

dards concerning the correct use of their authority, but
on Hart's theory such standards cannot be part of the law.

They are no explicit rules validated by the rule of recognition; therefore, although judges perhaps ought to follow

these standards, they cannot have a legally binding obliga-

tion to do so.

Moreover, such standards cannot themselves

dictate any particular decision or course of action in de-

ciding a difficult case.

In certain areas of open texture

where there is no common agreement among judges, no position
can be definitely proved to be right or wrong.

Hart con-
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eludes that "here at any moment a question may
arise to
which there is no answer -- only answers,"^
If there is no right answer to some
particular legal

question which falls outside the explicit authority
of
established rules, then the judge must simply choose

one

answer and thereby determine what the law is.

Since ex-

plicit law does not impose any specific legal rights or
duties in this difficult case, on Hart's theory neither

party in the dispute can have
cular decision.

a

legal right to a parti-

The rights and duties of the parties in-

volved do not exist prior to the judicial decision.

Once

the decision is made, legal obligations are determined and

imposed ex post facto

.

This legislative function of the courts certainly
goes beyond the ordinary citizen's conception of the appro-

priate role of judges as simply applying the

lav;.

Moreover,

judges themselves deliver their decisions as if they were

simply interpreting existing law or at most discovering new

implications and applications of determinate rules.

Yet

according to Hart, judges are often called upon to do more
than interpret the meaning of statutory language.

When no

formally recognized rules of law determine the decision of
a

particular case, the judge may look to historical legal

texts and writings for arguments with which to justify his

decision, but it is no requirement of the legal system that
he should use these sources.

"Perhaps we might speak of
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such sources as 'permissive'

legal sources to distinguish

them both from 'mandatory' legal or
formal sources such as
statute and from historical or material
sources ." 7
Kart's theory allows for "varied types
of reasoning

which courts characteristically use " 8 in
justifying their
creative function. The choices of judges are
not arbitrary
and may involve the impartial weighing
of various moral
values, as well as a balancing of the competing
interests
of those affected by these decisions.
ta.-ve

Judges will often,

into account the general requirements of justice
and

the particular social aims intended to be furthered
by

specific rules and attempt to justify their decisions
on
the basis of some acceptable general principle.

mg

The reason

process of judges then does not differ substantially

rrom the sort of argumentation which takes place in the

legislative body.
The creation of law by judges may be viewed as an

unfortunate but unavoidable aspect of the legal system.
Private citizens need to know and understand the general
rules which their conduct must conform to, but there are

inevitably some standards whose application cannot be deter

mined in advance (e.g. due care in negligence cases) and
others whose fringe areas remain questionable.
net view some amount of

ex_

Hart does

post facto legislation of legal

obligations as a serious problem for a legal system, as
long as this takes place within a general context in which

.
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citizens most of the time know what is legally
required of
them and the judges most of the time have
clear legal rules
on which to base their decisions.

Although every rule may be doubtful at some
points,
in order for a legal system to exist as a
coherent
and

unified system of rules there must be

a

general framework

of established standards which can be recognized
and followed without subjective or extra-legal determinations
by the

courts.

Nevertheless, "at the point where the texture is

open, individuals can only predict how courts will decide
and adjust their behavior accordingly

.
.
.
.
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CHAPTER III
Dworkin's rights thesis, which asserts that judicial

decisions always enforce the existing rights of citizens,
even where these rights are controversial because they are
not clearly defined by existing law, seems clearly incompatible with Hart's description of the open texture of law

which requires the exercise of judicial law-making powers.
Dworkin's claim that there is always

a

right answer to

difficult legal questions represents

a

quite different con-

ception of the function and responsibilities of judges.

He

maintains that ex post facto legislation of legal rights and
duties cannot be justified on any reasonable theory of American Constitutional law.

Hart's model of rules naturally

leads one to affirm the necessity of judicial discretion

when the area of applicability of rules runs out.

But

Dwcrkin argues that this conception of the role of judges is
neither necessary nor accurate as

a

description of the actual

role of judges in American law.
In his discussion of "Hard Cases", Dworkin contends,

in opposition to Hart, that it is never the role of judges
to invent new rights retrospectively.

Moreover, "judges

neither should be nor are deputy legislators, and the
familiar assumption, that where they go beyond political

decisions made by someone else they are legis lating, is
1

misleading"

x

Dworkin goes on to propose bis own theory
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what judges do, and should do, in deciding hard cases not
capable of being settled on the basis of explicit valid law,
or explicit social custom.

He maintains that it is always

the duty of judges to discover what the rights of citizens
are, not to make them up and impose obligations after the

fact.

In order to support his theory he must first of all

demonstrate that there are legitimate rights and duties
established by something other than explicit law which are,
nevertheless, legally binding.

If he is successful in this

he will have considerably undermined the positivist dis-

tinction between legal standards and other social standards,

especially those of general political morality.

Further,

Dworkin must propose a means by which judges can be said to
’’discover" rights of citizens not explicitly enumerated in

the law, taking into account the fact that there is much con-

troversy among responsible judges and lawyers over the

existence of particular rights.
Central to Dworkin'

s

criticisms of Hart, and to the

elaboration of his own theory, is his affirmation of the
existence of legal principles which are not, and do not
function in the same way as, legal rules.

He does not

argue that such principles must exist, or otherwise support
this claim, except by calling attention to the sorts of

justifications judges in fact often appeal to in defense of
their decisions.

Examples Dworkin presents of the principle^

»
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invoked by judges include such propositions as "no one shall
be permitted to profit from his own wrong " 2 and "the manu-

facturer is under

a

special obligation in connection with

the construction, promotion and sale of his cars

." 3

Dworkin explains that there is a logical distinction

between such legal principles and explicit legal rules.
Therefore these principles cannot be subsumed under a general
theory of rules.

First of all, rules are intended to apply

in an all-or-nothing fashion.

If the circumstances of a

particular case can be shown to fall under the provisions of
a

valid rule, then there can be no question that the rule

applies.

A definite answer is given and the rule enforced.

There may be exceptions to the rule, but these can be (at
least in theory) enumerated and taken into account.

A

principle, however, may apply only sometimes; there are no

specified conditions under which it must necessarily be
applied.

Instances in which the principle does not apply

are not exceptions similar to exceptions to a rule, because

they could not, even in theory, be enumerated and included
in a more complete statement of the principle.

principle "states

a

Instead, a

reason that argues in one direction, but
,

does not necessitate a particular decision."

4

If a legal principle is relevant to a particular case

the judge must take it into account, but it need not be the

determining consideration in the case.
instances be outweighed b^

anotht^j.

It may in some

pj.inc-i.ple

Oj.

>-ne

a.<u \<

Such counter- instances may demonstrate the relative weight
or importance of a principle in the system of law, but they
”

not invalidate it.

weight.

Rules do not have this dimension of

If one apparently valid rule conflicts with another

then one or the other must not be valid, and will be overruled.

Moreover, rules have pedigrees which certify them

as valid legal standards, whereas principles do not.

Legal principles are not enacted as law by the legislature or the courts.

They originate in

a

"sense of

appropriateness developed in the profession and the public
over time; their continued power depends upon this sense of

appropriateness being sustained ." 5

in order to defend some

principle as a legal standard one must produce some evidence
of institutional support for it, in statutes and precedents,

but there is no simple test for its validity.
a

particular principle by grappling with

ing,

a

developing and interacting standards

"We argue for

whole set of shift-

...

about institutional

responsibility, statutory interpretation, the persuasive
force of various sorts of precedent, the relation of all of
these to contemporary moral practices, and hosts of other

such standards,"
If judges in fact do appeal to legal principles in

making decisions, then

a theory of

law which does not take

these into account must be inadequate.

If the positivist

does not treat such principles which are not explicit rules
as valid law,

then judges have no duty to take them into
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consideration.

They must be viewed as extra-legal standards

which judges are free to call upon in support of
their decisions, but which have no legally binding status.

If,

however, some principles are actually accepted by
judges as

part oi the law, then there will be no clear test or
rule of

recognition for determining what the law in fact is, because
of the controversial nature of principles.

Dworkin asserts that at least some principles are

generally accepted by judges and lawyers as legal, not
simply moral standards.

If he is right,

then some rights and

duties of citizens may be established by legal standards

other than the explicit rules of law.

"Legal obligation

might be imposed by a constellation of principles as well as
by an established rule,"

Consideration of these principles

and the arguments in support of them would enable the judge
to discover the rights of individuals in hard cases by exr

amining legal standards instead of creating new rights, even
though his conclusions might remain controversial.
In order to clarify and defend his contention that

courts do not and should not act as deputy legislatures,

Dworkin introduces what he considers to be a fundamental

distinction between arguments of principle and arguments of
policy.

Arguments of principle are intended to justify

a

specific political decision by demonstrating that the decision

respects or secures an individual or group right which

is'

'
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recognized by that society or political system.

Arguments

of policy justify a political decision in a utilitarian way,

on the grounds that it advances or protects some collective

social aim which is in the interest of the community as a
whole.

Arguments of policy will be concerned with deter-

mining the nature and relative intensity of the demands and
interests of various groups within the community, and with

compromising between these competing interests in pursuit of
the general welfare of the community.

Political decisions

of the legislature will generally be based on a consideration
of both types of argument, although in varying degrees of

relative importance.

According to Dworkin, judicial decisions should be
supported only by arguments of principle, not policy.

In

clear cases, where the rights of the individuals are defined
by explicit law and judges merely enforce existing statutes,

there is no room for policy considerations.

A judge may not

overrule the precise statements of legislative decisions
simply because he thinks
for the community.

a

different policy would be better

Even in hard cases, where statutes are

vague or uncertain, if the judges have a duty to uphold the
rights of citizens then they should not be concerned with

other issues of general social policy.

This is true because

of the nature of individual rights.

Dworkin characterizes individual rights as political
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trumps over majority interests.

Individuals are said to

have political rights when "for some reason,

a

collective

goal is not a sufficient justification for denying them what
they wish, as individuals, to have or do ." 8

A denial of

these rights for purely utilitarian reasons would constitute
an injustice.

On Hart's theory there would be no injustice

done if courts weigh issues of social policy in deciding hard
cases because there are no existing rights to be violated.

But if

(at least in disputes between individuals or groups)

one side always has a right to a favorable decision, judges

must be concerned with arguments defining and supporting the
rights involved.

Other sorts of arguments will be irrelevant

and inappropriate.

The right to a particular legal decision is a special

kind of political right.

Dworkin must clarify the general

nature of political rights, and distinguish between differing
types.

He identifies a political aim as a state of affairs

which should be advanced by political decisions according to
a given political theory.

political aim.

A political right is an individuated

An individual has a right to something if it

counts in favor of a political decision that it promotes that
state of affairs, even if some other political aim is thereby

disserved.
aim.

A political goal is a non-individuated political

It requires no particular liberties or opportunities

for particular individuals.

Which political aims will be
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viewed as rights and which as goals will depend on the

particular political theory.
be absolute.

Moreover, rights need not

They may have differing weights against other

rights or against important collective goals, although in
order to be considered as rights they may not be outweighed
by all other social aims.

The benefits and burdens of a social policy serving
some collective goal may be unequally distributed among

individuals as long as the effect is to promote the overall

welfare of the community.
a

Political rights, however, have

different distributional character.

If individuals,

because of their status as citizens of a particular state,
are held to have certain basic rights, then these rights

must be shared equally by all citizens.

This standard of

distributional fairness does not apply so rigidly to other
social goods.

Dworkin further distinguishes between what he calls

background rights and institutional rights.

Background

rights are derived from a general theory of political

mcvrrality;

they justify political decisions by society in the abstract.

Institutional rights are determined by the nature and processes of institutions in

a

given society; they provide

a

justification for the political decisions made by a specified
institution.

"Political rights are creatures of both history

and morality: what an individual is entitled to have in civil
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society depends upon both the practice and the justice
of
its political institutions

." 9

Judges are not free to

determine the rights of citizens purely on the basis of
arguments concerning general political morality.

They must

examine the specific character of our legal system, its
history, its functions and its traditions, in order to

discover what rights it should be expected to protect.

There

is no point at which the requirements of legal traditions run

cut and judges can rely on their own moral intuitions in

deciding cases.

Determination of rights involves careful

consideration of the history of legal systems, in light of
the moral principles underlying their formulation, rather

than a simple examination of explicit rules.
Dworki n also makes a distinction between abstract and

concrete rights.
aim,

An abstract right is a general political

like the right to free speech, which has not been

clarified in terms of its weight in relation to other political aims.

A right is made more concrete when its weight

in various circumstances has been more precisely defined.

The abstract right to free speech is not absolute; its

limitations in particular contexts must be defined in order
for courts to uphold the concrete rights of individuals

derived from it.

The rights which judges must "discover"

in order to settle difficult cases correctly are concrete

institutional rights

—

particular legal rights.

Legislators may make

ad_

hoc

decisions about social
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policy, experiment with various methods of achieving collect-

ive goals and make different sorts of compromises between

competing interest groups at different times.

They are under

no obligation to treat all individuals alike, or to follow

an entirely consistent set of stragegies in promoting
the

general welfare.

However, the doctrine of political re-

sponsibility, which states that officials must make only
those decisions which they can justify within the political

theory they use to justify their other decisions, applies

somewhat differently to judges than to legislators.
The determinations of legal rights that judges arrive

atcannot be isolated judgements based on special intuitions
about specific cases.

They must be formulated within a

coherent and systematic legal theory, and applied in
sistent way to all individuals.

a con-

"An argument of principle

can supply a justification for a particular decision, under
the doctrine of political responsibility, only if the prin-

ciple cited can be shown to be consistent with earlier decisions not recanted, and with decisions that the institution
is prepared to make in hypothetical circumstances.

This

difference between the responsibilities of judges and legislators underlines the difference between the functions of

these officials, and helps to account for the particular

attention that judges must direct towards precedents and

hypothetical examples.
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The general legal theory which a judge develops
to

account for the purpose and function of the various
aspects
of the legal system will enable him to interpret
statutes and
e\

aluate precedents and principles in

oisuent way.
0±

-

° ne

a

coherent and con—

In the process of applying his general theory

nature of the legal system to questions concerning the

legislative purpose behind particular statutes and legal

principles which are embedded in positive law, he will develop
a

theory of legal rights which he can use to settle contro-

versial issues.

Such general theories will vary somewhat

among responsible judges and lawyers.

Yet an individual

judge will always have a theory and a legal framework within

which to decide hard cases, without having to legislate new
rights or make decisions based on extra-legal standards.
In order to develop such a legal theory a judge must

ask himself certain sorts of questions.

He must consider

various political philosophies which can be used to justify
the legal system as a whole, or some of its aspects, and see

which of these is most satisfactory as an account of the
specific details of legal institutions.

He must interpret

the general legal statutes and common law precedents in con-

structing a theory of jurisprudence which is consistent with

established legal principles.
Controversies arise, however, because different judges
will formulate different sorts of answers to these general
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questions, and therefore will not agree about the concrete
legal rights of individuals in particular cases.

If differ-

ent conclusions are arrived at, depending on the personal

political convictions of particular judges, how can one claim
that there is a right answer to a controversial legal question, and not simply answers as Hart suggests?

insists that the proposition that there is
a

a

Dworkin

right answer to

difficult question does not mean that there is some unam-

biguous and ultimately authoritative method of validating

decisions.

Rather, it is a "complex statement about the re-

sponsibilities of its officials and participants ." 11
One might object that it seems offensive to democratic

principles foe judges' decisions about the legal rights of
citizens to depend on the subjective judgements about political morality which underlie their general theories.

Dworkin

would reply, however, that if legal rights are not exhaustively fixed by explicit legal rules, then one lacks

objective standard for determining them.

a

strictly

Any definition of

these rights will involve personal judgements at some level,
and the issue cannot be separated from general questions of

political morality.

The judge will not defend his decision

on the basis of his personal preferences, but rather because
he believes that the answer derived from that theory is the

right one.

.
.

.
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CHAPTER

IV

Although Dworkin insists that acceptance
of his rights
thesis leads one necessarily to the
conclusion that
legal

.

positivism is inadequate as a general theory
of what law
""

'

1

-‘‘yyested in the first chapter of this
essay that

Dworkin ’s analysis of the duties of judges
in the United
States could be accomodated within a general
positivist
theory.
It is not clear that the positivist
assertion that
law is fundamentally distinct from other moral
or social
standards is incompatible with Dworkin

'

s

contention that the

concrete rights of American citizens cannot be correctly

determined except through
reasoning.

a

complicated process of moral

Hart, for instance, does not deny that some

moral principles may form part of the law in particular
societies.

He does not insist on a strict division between

these two sorts of standards as actual social phenomena; he
-

only maintains that there

.is

no necessary connection between

them.

The positivist character of Hart's theory consists in
his description of law and legal systems as socially rela-

tive institutions created in accordance with differing

social interests, customs and purposes.

Dworkin

's

rights

thesis conflicts with one aspect of Hart's description of

how legal systems operate, but not necessarily with the
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general positivist point of view about
what law is.
As Dworkin emphasizes in his
defense of individual
rights, the American Constitution
establishes some moral
rights of citizens as legal rights.
The language

of these

Constitutional clauses is necessarily vague
and abstract,
mentioning such concepts as liberty
due
1

•

'equal protection under the law'.

1

,

process' and

The precise meaning of

these provisions and their specific application
to concrete

situations is not clearly defined or elaborated,
and this
i

agueness has led to considerable legal controversy
over

\vhat

concrete rights are in fact protected.

Nevertheless,

these general moral concepts are included in what has
been

formally accepted as part of the established law in this
country.
To apply such abstract rules to concrete issues con-

cerning legal rights and obligations, judges must interpret
the meaning and intention of these general provisions.

This will involve them in a complicated process of examining
the principles of legal philosophy underlying these concepts

and of explaining their direct moral implications.

Perhaps

those principles which are implicit in Constitutional law,
or directly derived from fundamental requirements of ac-

cepted law, should be regarded as legally-binding standards
for judicial interpretation of legal rules and determination
of concrete legal rights.

The rule of recognition for valid law in the United
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States might thus be extended to
include those principles of
political morality which are directly
required
for a co-

herent determination and justification
of accepted legal
rules.
Consideration of these principles in a
consistent
theory of law might allow judges to define
or

•

"discover"

the existing legal rights of citizens
in difficult cases

where the applicability of explicit rules is
questionable.
In oh is way Hart's troublesome doctrine
of the open

texture

of the law could be avoided in an analysis
of American law

and judicial discretion limited to the weak sense
of inter-

preting legal rules according to authoritative standards.

Dworkin

'

s

insistence that judges should, and characteris-

tically do, decide cases on the basis of existing legal
standards need not invalidate Hart's general theory if the
rule of recognition as defined by judicial practice in-

cludes the principles Dworkin claims judges do appeal to.
Dworkin, however, argues against 'the possibility of

extending Hart’s rule of recognition to include principles.
He admits that Hart does not define rules in the same way

Dworkin does in his discussion of the distinction between
rules and principles; Hart's use of the term 'rule' is not

restricted to those legal standards which can be applied
in an absolute way, or which are explicitly articulated.

Yet Dworkin maintains that there can be no clear test of

pedigree for principles that is concerned not with content
but with the manner in which they were adopted.

They are
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not enacted like legislative statutes,
or established as
precedents like judicial decisions. They
must possess some
amount of "institutional support" to justify
the claim that
they should be recognized as part of the
law.
But they are
not tormally established in an authoritative
way.
They

originate as legal principles in the "sense of
appropriateness" they develop over time in the legal
profession and
the general public.
One might attempt to formulate the pedigree for

principles in terms of their relation to explicit law: only
those principles which have the feature of being implicit
or embedded in existing law should be recognized as legally

binding.

The problem with this definition is that judges

in ract disagree about which principles should be counted
as binding on them,

as well as about the relative import-

ance of such principles.

It would seem that since judicial

practices and opinions concerning the status of principles
are not concurrent, these cannot constitute a commonly-

accepted criterion for the legal validity of principles.
The rule of recognition for law is supposed to be
rule on Hart's theory.

'Some other

a

social

normative stipulation of

the duty of judges to recognize certain standards as law

could be viewed as a correct criterion for valid law, but
this would not be the sort of socially-accepted rule Hart's

theory requires.
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Moreover, the complexity of the
development of a
coherent legal theory identifying all
the principles
appropriately related to established law
would not fit
Hart's notion of a clear test for
pedigree.
"The test of
institutional support provides no mechanical
or historical
or morally natural basis for
establishing one theory of
law as the soundest ." 1 This process
of developing a legal
theory would involve substantial controversial
assumptions
and conclusions about moral and
political theory which
could not themselves be tested for validity or
acceptance
by any social rule. They could only be
supported by con-

vincing moral arguments.

"But these arguments must include

arguments on issues of normative political theory, like
tiie

nature of society's duty of equality that go beyond

the positivists'

conception of the limits of the considera-

tions relevant to deciding what the law is

." 2

Despite Dworkin's objections it still seems theo-

retically possible to distinguish those principles which
should be regarded as relevant to judicial decisions from

other moral standards.

A formal definition of legal prin-

ciples as those which are implicit or embedded in established law would not identify any specific principles which

should be recognized, nor even elaborate exactly how one

would determine that some principle fits this definition.
Yet this criterion for validity could well in fact be a
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commonly-accepted social rule among
judges and lawyers.
Judges might disagree to some extent
in

their artic-

ulation of the political theory
underlying the framework of
our legal system and thus he led
to differing conclusions
about what is implicit in a set of
legal rules.

But they

night still agree on the general standard
that only those
principles inherent in the political framework
of our

system can be considered part of the law.

Any claim that a

particular principle is in fact part of the law
would have
to be argued for on the basis of that general
standard.
No other sort of justification could be given
for appealing
to some principle in deciding a legal question.

This formal definition of specifically legal
principles*
v.

ould preserve in an abstract way the positivist distinction

between

lav;

and other standards of political morality.

The

concrete determination of what the law actually requires in

particular cases would, as Dworkin observes, involve
deal of subjective moral argumentation.

a

great

But this moral

reasoning would be specific to illuminating the nature of

established legal institutions.

Judges would net be free

to endorse or appeal to 'any principles which they could not

reasonably argue to be somehow implicit in the existing law
of the United States.

The social rule of recognition could be stated from
an external point of view as including all explicit and im-

plicit requirements of political decisions and enactments
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oy authorized officials, in
accordance with fundamental

Constitutional provisions and restrictions.

But to the

judges and officials viewing the legal
system from an internal perspective, the agreement on the
inclusion of im-

plicit principles would involve more than

abstract concurrence.

a

'

verbal and

The conformity of officials in

accepting this rule of recognition would be
evidenced by
their actual practice of proceeding in the
attempt to deter
mi " e V/nat

implicit in the law.

Although their conclu-

sions might differ, their procedure would reflect
the

existence of a social rule.

Private citizens could equally

well engage in the same process if they had sufficient

knowledge of established law.
The formal defintion of legal principles does not

really provide

a

as valid law.

The legal rights of citizens cannot always

simple test for what is generally accepted

be determined in any clear-cut and demonstrably certain way

However, the positivist might simply view this

a

peculiar

ract about our legal institutions, resulting from the in-

clusion of vague moral requirements in explicit Constitutional law.

The abstract moral concepts which appear in

the Constitution are endorsed and accepted as authoritative

legal standards even though there may be various and con-

flicting conceptions of the meaning and implications of
those provisions.
There exist accepted social rules establishing the
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moral limitations on what is valid
law; what is controversial is the interpretation of
those restrictions and
provisions.
The duty of the judge to use
his best judgment
determining the legal rights and
obligations of citizens
nay be imposed by a social rule
governing judicial

m

practice,

even though there may be no objective
method for deciding
v.hether or not his conclusions are
correct.

Dworkin might object that the positivist
claim that
mere is always a social rule which settles what
rules or

principles judges must recognize as law is not
supported by
this re f ormulation of the rule of recognition.

If legal

rights and obligations are essentially controversial
at

a

concrete level, and require substantial subjective
assumptions and judgments for their specific determination,
then

there is not an objective or commonly accepted rule of

recognition of what is law.

Where there is no such rule,

the distinction between legal and moral standards cannot be

defined according to positivist criteria.
However, Dworkin cannot be claiming that there is no

general social rule for recognizing valid law.

If he were,

then judges would have no way of figuring out their legal

duties even in simple cases.

Judges would not then be

bound by any standards of social acceptance in their deter-

mination of legal rights and obligations.

Some rules of

law and judicial practice must be viewed as settled by social
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acceptance for Dworkin'

Dworkin

'

s

judge,

s

theory of judicial responsibility.

"accepts the main uncontrover
sial and

regulative rules of the law in his
jurisdiction.
He accepts
that is, that statutes have the
general power to create and
extinguish legal rights and that judges
have the general

duty to follow the earlier decisions
of the courts ." 3
Dworkin'

s

judge does not question the fact that
the

Constitution creates legal rights and duties
and validates
rhe legality of statutes.
He only questions what

principles

are assumed by this fact and what specific
rights are there-

by created.

His legal theory is concerned with discovering

uhe principles justifying those constitutional
provisions,

legislative statutes and judicial precedents in order
to

determine the non-explicit extension of these laws to concrete cases.

He does not begin by questioning the fact of

the validity of those uncontroversial elements of the law.
It seems that Dworkin must accept the accuracy of

something like Hart's rule of recognition in order to show
that there is an established legal system with a complex
set of authoritative enactments and precedents whose general

character judges must interpret and justify.

The problem

for Dworkin is just that Hart's test does not include

enough: the test for explicit rules may be commonly accepted
but not the test for other legal standards and principles.

A social rule of recognition will settle some, but not all,
legal questions, according to Dworkin 's theory.
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Although Dworkin might not accept
the existence of
this proposed revised social rule
of recognition as a
genuine social rule because of its lack
of specificity in
concrete determinations, nevertheless I
think it is a legitimate and defensible interpretation
of the main thrust of
his rights thesis.

It seems to allow for the existing
con-

troversy over difficult legal issues and
protect Dworkin 's
claim that there is always a right answer
to such questions
despite the lack of social agreement. At the
same time it

seems to clarify the relationship between Dworkin
's concerns
and the general approach of positivist theory.

Since

Dworkin relies on some sort of postivist theory similar
to
Hart's as

a

basis for determining what the law is in rela-

tively simple cases and does not propose any other general
theory to replace Hart's, it seems plausible to maintain
that the differences between the two conceptions of what
law is are not so fundamental as Dworkin supposes.

.
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